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  This appendix contains the proof of the part of Proposition 4 that is not shown in 
the text, namely, under the optimal joint tax and liability regime, the optimal tax t** < 
E(y) provided that injurer benefits b(x) display decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
  To establish this claim, observe that under the joint tax and liability regime, social 
welfare as a function of the tax t is 
 W TL(t) = ∫
0
m
[b(x*(t + py)) – x*(t + py)y]f(y)dy                   (1) 
since it was shown already that λ = 1. Hence  
  WTL′(t) = ∫
0
m
x*′(t + py)[b′(x*(t + py)) – y]f(y)dy,                                           (2) 
where x*′(t + py) is the derivative of x*(t + py) with respect to t. It will be shown that 
  WTL′(E(y)) = ∫
0
m
x*′(E(y) + py)[b′(x*(E(y) + py)) – y]f(y)dy < 0.                    (3) 
As I will note below, an essentially identical argument to what I am about to give will 
prove also that WTL′(t) < 0 for any t > E(y).  Hence, it will follow that the optimal tax t** 
must be less than E(y). 
  Observe first that since the optimal tax under a tax only regime is E(y) (from 
Proposition 1), b(x*(t)) – x*(t)E(y) is maximized at t = E(y).  Therefore,   
b′(x*(E(y)))x*′(E(y)) – x*′(E(y))E(y) = 0, which implies that b′(x*(E(y))) – E(y) = 0.  This 




[b′(x*(E(y)) – y]f(y)dy = 0.                       (4) 




[b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y]f(y)dy > 0.                     (5) 
  To this end, rewrite (4) as 
  ∫
0   
E(y)[b′(x*(E(y)) – y]f(y)dy + ∫
E(y)
m   [b′(x*(E(y)) – y]f(y)dy = 0.               (6) 
The first term in (6) is positive, since the integrand is positive for each y < E(y). This 
claim about (6) is readily seen from Figure 1. In particular, in region A, an upward 
movement in the line x*(E(y)) brings x closer to the optimum x*(y) at each y, and given 
the concavity of welfare b(x) – xy in x, this change in x increases welfare.
1  The second 
term in (6) is negative, since the integrand is negative for each y > E(y).  The explanation 
is analogous to what was just stated; in regions B and C, an upward movement in the line 





                                                 
 
1 That is, b′(x) – y = 0 at x*(y), and thus b′(x) – y > 0 for x < x*(y) since b″(x) < 0.  Hence, 
b′(x*(E(y)) – y > 0, since, for each y in A, x*(E(y)) < x*(y).  I will omit further explanations like this one 
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  Next, observe that 
      ∫
0   
E(y)[b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y]f(y)dy > ∫
0   
E(y)[b′(x*(E(y)) – y]f(y)dy.                 (7) 
This also can be seen from Figure 1.  In region A, an increase in x from x*(E(y) + py) will 
increase welfare more than an increase in x from x*(E(y)) since the former is more distant 
from x*(y) and welfare is concave in x.  Similarly, we have that 
                 ∫
E(y)
m   [b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y]f(y)dy > ∫
E(y)
m   [b′(x*(E(y)) – y]f(y)dy.           (8) 
To explain, in region B, an increase in x from x*(E(y) + py) will raise welfare since x will 
become closer to x*(y), whereas an increase in x from x*(E(y)) will lower welfare since x 
will become farther from x*(y). In region C, an increase in x from x*(E(y) + py) will 
reduce welfare by less than an increase in x from x*(E(y)) since the former is closer to 
x*(y).  Hence, over both regions B and C, b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y > b′(x*(E(y)) – y, from 
which (8) follows.  Finally, (7) and (8) imply (5).   
  I now show that (5) implies (3) given the assumption that b displays decreasing 
absolute risk aversion.  Note first that the integrand of (3) equals the integrand of (5) 
multiplied by x*′(E(y) + py).   
  I first claim that x*′(E(y) + py) < 0 and that it increases with y. To verify this, 
observe first that x*′(E(y) + py) = 1/b″(x*(E(y) + py)) < 0, for differentiation of b′(x(t)) = 
t + py with respect to t gives x′(t) = 1/b″(x(t)).  Second, note that x*′(E(y) + py) will 
increase with y if b′′′(x) > 0.  In particular, differentiation of x′(t) = 1/b″(x(t)) gives x″(t) = 
–b′′′(x(t))x′(t)/[b″(x(t))]
2, so that the sign of x″(t) equals the sign of b′′′(x(t)).  The 
assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that b′′′(x(t)) > 0, for this 
assumption means that –b″(x)/b′(x) decreases with x.   
  I now show that (3) holds.  Recall that I demonstrated above that [b′(x*(E(y) + py) 




py) – y]f(y)dy > 0.  It will follow that for any function w(y) such that w(y) > 0 and w′(y) < 




w(y)[b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y]f(y)dy >   0 .            ( 9 )  
To show (9), let w* equal w(E(y)/(1 – p)), namely, the value of w at the point between 




w(y)[b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y]f(y)dy > ∫
0
m
w*[b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y]f(y)dy,   (10) 
since w(y)[b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y]f(y) > w*[b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y]f(y) for y < E(y)/(1 – p) 
(because for such y, w(y) > w* and [b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y]f(y) > 0) as well as for y > 




w*[b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y]f(y)dy = w*∫
0
m
[b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y]f(y)dy > 0,                  (11) 
since w* > 0 and (5) holds.  Hence, (9) is established.  Now since x*′(E(y) + py) < 0 and 
increases with y, we know that –x*′(E(y) + py) > 0 and decreases with y.  Thus,  




x*′(E(y) + py)[b′(x*(E(y) + py) – y]f(y)dy > 0,                    (12) 
which is equivalent to (3).    
  Finally, the argument that has been given would apply essentially unchanged for 
any t > E(y) and would show that WTL′(t) < 0.  The only difference would be that the   4
graph of x*(t + py) would lie below that of x*(E(y) + py) in Figure 1; but this would not 
affect the logic of any of the steps of the proof.  
 